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This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we …. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082165
, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723001
convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways … altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their employees … than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723256
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040813
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper employs a principal-agent model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029345
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105146
, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013154985
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147137
A worker's utility may increase with his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principal-agent model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318976
, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve highquality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316438