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his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012821112
We conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain of 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance increases with the team's social cohesion, because social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253632
This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make a firm in a competitive labor market face an upward-sloping supply curve of labor, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337969
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349324
We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350353
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377106
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377373