This paper critiques some of the properties of the so-called quot;efficient component pricing rulequot; (ECPR) for access to a bottleneck (monopoly) facility. When a rival and the bottleneck monopolist both produce a complementary component to the bottleneck service, the ECPR specifies that the...

I analyze the salient features of networks and point out the similarities between the economic structure of networks and the structure of vertically related industries. The analysis focuses on positive consumption and production externalities, commonly called network externalities. I discuss...

In developing countries, mobile telecom networks have emerged as major providers of financial services, bypassing the sparse retail networks of traditional banks. We analyze a large individual-level data set of mobile money transactions in Tanzania to provide evidence of the impact of mobile...

In developing countries, mobile telecom networks have emerged as major providers of financial services, bypassing the sparse retail networks of traditional banks. We analyze a large individual-level data set of mobile money transactions in Tanzania. Transactions can be classified as (i) money...

We study the dynamics of an oligopoly market with network externalities. In contrast to earlier work, we consider a model where products are vertically differentiated and the number of firms is arbitrary. We show that the degree of network externalities has a one-to-one relationship with the...

We present a model of a market failure based on a requirement provision by digital platforms in the acquisition of personal information from users of other products/services. We establish the economic harm from the market failure and the requirement using traditional antitrust methodology....

Following up on our initial comments at the Tunney Act proceeding of the proposed merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, we discuss DOJ's criticisms of these comments, explaining why these criticisms are baseless. Moreover, using evidence from the NY v. Deutsche Telecom trial, we provide new...

We present a model where producers of complementary goods have the option to practice mixed bundling. In the first stage of a two-stage game, firms choose between a mixed bundling and a non- bundling strategy. In the second stage, firms choose prices. We show that mixed bundling is a dominant...

We examine the incentives of firms to form coalitions based on adherence to common technical standards. Many network goods as well as non-network goods with close complements exhibit quot;network externalitiesquot; -- i.e., the value of such goods increases with the size of sales of compatible...