This paper critiques some of the properties of the so-called "efficient component pricing rule" (ECPR) for access to a bottleneck (monopoly) facility. When an entrant/rival and the bottleneck monopolist both produce a complementary component to the bottleneck service, the ECPR specifies that the...

We extend the results of our article, "Access and Interconnection Pricing? How Efficient Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Antitrust Bulletin (1995). In the presence of a monopolized essential input, we show that application of the Efficient Component Pricing Rule ("ECPR") in pricing...

This paper critiques some of the properties of the so-called "efficient component pricing rule" (ECPR) for access to a bottleneck (monopoly) facility. When an entrant/rival and the bottleneck monopolist both produce a complementary component to the bottleneck service, the ECPR specifies that the...

This paper develops some important concepts with respect to networks and compatibility. We note that the familiar concept of complementarity lies at the heart of the concept of compatibility. We further note the distinction between two-way networks (e.g., telephones, railroads, the Internet) and...