We present a model where producers of complementary goods have the option to practice mixed bundling. In the first stage of a two-stage game, firms choose between a mixed bundling and a non- bundling strategy. In the second stage, firms choose prices. We show that mixed bundling is a dominant...

We examine the incentives of firms to form coalitions based on adherence to common technical standards. Many network goods as well as non-network goods with close complements exhibit quot;network externalitiesquot; -- i.e., the value of such goods increases with the size of sales of compatible...

This note shows that a monopolist facing any linear demand system for n goods and no fixed costs will produce positive quantities of all goods as long as demand is positive for all goods when all are sold at marginal cost. This is in contrast with the traditional view that, in general, a...

Liquidity plays a crucial role in financial exchange markets. Markets typically create liquidity through spatial consolidation with specialist/market makers matching orders arriving at different times. However, continuous trading systems have an inherent weakness in the potential for...

Non-uniform pricing equilibria are shown to dominate uniform pricing equilibria in free entry, monopolistically competitive markets with identical consumers. The non- uniform pricing equilibrium is welfare optimal. Comparisons of Cournot and non-uniform pricing equilibria in terms of the...

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers, might impose download limits on content consumers: doing so increases the degree to which those consumers view content providers products as substitutes. This, in turn, intensifies competition...

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile-phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes the providers of the content consumer purchase to either reduce their prices or...

We analyze the equilibrium size of networks under alternative market structures. Networks are characterized by positive size externalities (commonly called quot;network externalitiesquot;). That is, the benefits of the addition of an extra node (or an extra customer) exceed the private benefits...

We show that, despite coordination in the quality level of the components that they provide, independent vertically-related (disintegrated) monopolists will provide products of lower quality level than a sole integrated monopolist. Further, the integrated monopolist achieves higher market...

We analyze the salient features of networks and point out the similarities between the economic structure of networks and the structure of vertically related industries. The analysis focuses on positive consumption and production externalities, commonly called network externalities. We discuss...