Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 95
Cover Image
Blockholders and Corporate Governance
Edmans, Alex - 2018
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the channels through which blockholders (large shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a firm's operations, otherwise known as “voice.” These...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938447
Cover Image
Feedback Effects, Asymmetric Trading, and the Limits to Arbitrage
Edmans, Alex - 2018
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is endogenous to trading, due to feedback from the financial market to corporate decisions. Trading reveals private information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940494
Cover Image
Blockholders : A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex - 2019
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of blockholders (large shareholders) in corporate governance. We start with the underlying property rights of public corporations; we discuss how blockholders are critical in addressing free-rider problems and why, like...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903026
Cover Image
Chapter 8. Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex; Holderness, Clifford G. - 2017
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of blockholders (large shareholders) in corporate governance. We start with the underlying property rights of public corporations; we discuss how blockholders are critical in addressing free-rider problems and why, like...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023374
Cover Image
The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market
Edmans, Alex - 2013
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay higher … salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to regulation) do …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095235
Cover Image
Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530386
Cover Image
Feedback Effects and the Limits to Arbitrage
Jiang, Wei; Edmans, Alex; Goldstein, Itay - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011
This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a firm's fundamental value is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and helps them improve their real decisions, in turn enhancing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371805
Cover Image
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance
Edmans, Alex; Fang, Vivian W.; Zur, Emanuel - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011
This paper studies the effect of stock liquidity on blockholders' choice of governance mechanisms. We focus on hedge funds as they are unconstrained by legal restrictions and business ties, and thus have all governance channels at their disposal. Since the threat of governance, not just actual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359911
Cover Image
Risk and CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - Weiss Center for International Financial Research, … - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709659
Cover Image
Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - Weiss Center for International Financial Research, … - 2010
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709663