Consider a dynamic model with two countries or coalitions that consume and trade fossil fuel. A non-abating country owns the entire fuel stock and is not concerned about climate change, represented by a ceiling on the carbon dioxide concentration. The government of the other country implements...

Consider a dynamic model with two countries or coalitions that consume and trade fossil fuel. A non-abating country owns the entire fuel stock and is not concerned about climate change, represented by a ceiling on the carbon dioxide concentration. The government of the other country implements...

In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel and deposits, some coalition of countries fights climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. If the coalition’s policy parameters are the demand and supply of deposits...

This paper analyzes the formation of self-enforcing climate agreements, or stable climate coalitions, when all countries have the option to fight climate change by purchasing (the right to extract) fossil-energy deposits. First, we consider the stand-alone deposit purchase policy and then...

This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories’ threat to embargo (potential)...

This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories’ threat to embargo (potential)...

This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto...

This paper provides a rationale for subsidizing green (renewable) energy production. Within a multi-country model where energy is produced with mobile capital in green and dirty production, we investigate the countries’ decentralized choice of emissions taxes and green energy subsidies....

This paper provides a rationale for subsidizing green (renewable) energy production. Within a multi-country model where energy is produced with mobile capital in green and dirty production, we investigate the countries' decentralized choice of emissions taxes and green energy subsidies. Without...

This paper provides a rationale for subsidizing green (renewable) energy production. Within a multi-country model where energy is produced with mobile capital in green and dirty production, we investigate the countries' decentralized choice of emissions taxes and green energy subsidies. Without...