In this international study, we explore the benefits of strong institutions (or the perils of weak institutions) through the lens of equity issuance. We posit that strong governance—e.g., rule of law, control of corruption and shareholder rights—does not necessarily confer benefits on the...

Motivated by the recent rise of state capitalism, this paper investigates the effects of government ownership on market valuations across a sample of publicly listed corporations from East Asia. We find strong, robust evidence that government-owned firms exhibit higher market valuation than...

We examine the governance role of multiple large shareholder structures (MLSS) to determine their valuation effects in a sample of 1,252 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies. We find that the presence, number, and size of multiple large shareholders are associated with a...

Using a sample of cross-listed firms from 51 countries and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits corporate governance shocks induced by cross-listing in the U.S., we find that firms tend to engage in less tax avoidance after cross-listing. This effect is more pronounced for firms...

Using a comprehensive set of firms from 57 countries over the 2000–2016 period, we examine the relation between institutional investor horizons and firm-level credit ratings. Controlling for firm- and country-specific factors, as well as for firm fixed effects, we find that larger long-term...

Using a unique sample of newly privatized firms from 59 countries, this study provides new evidence about the agency costs of state ownership and new insight into the corporate governance role of country-level institutions. Consistent with agency theory, we find strong and robust evidence that...

Using a new measure of shareholder inattention based on exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we document a positive and significant relation between firms with distracted institutional shareholders and the cost of debt financing. This effect is stronger for firms with...

CEOs of public (listed) firms earn more than their counterparts in similar private (unlisted) firms. This can either be because rent extraction is easier in public firms than in private firms, or because managing a public firm involves more legal and institutional responsibilities than managing...

For a sample comprised of 36,105 U.S. firm-year observations from 1985 to 2008, we find that firms located in more religious counties enjoy cheaper equity financing costs. This result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including alternative assumptions and model specifications,...

We study how the heterogeneity between the CEO and independent board directors as a group stemming from cultural diversity affects debt pricing in bad times. Using a novel approach to identify directors’ cultural backgrounds based on their ancestral origins, we find that greater...