In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents...

The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better...

In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents...

In this paper we introduce identifying restrictions into a Markov-switching vector autoregression model. We define a separate set of impulse responses for each Markov regime to show how fundamental disturbances affect the variables in the model dependent on the regime. We go to illustrate the...

In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents...

In this paper we introduce identifying restrictions into a Markov-switching vector autoregression model.We define a separate set of impulse responses for each Markov regime to show how fundamental disturbances affect the variables in the model dependent on the regime.We go to illustrate the use...