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Eine panelökonometrische Überp...
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ECONIS (ZBW)
33
RePEc
26
EconStor
6
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10
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1
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence
Blatter, Marc
;
Emons, Winand
;
Sticher, Silvio
-
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
-
2014
distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of
deterrence
if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of
deterrence
. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083745
Saved in:
2
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence
Blatter, Marc
;
Emons, Winand
;
Sticher, Silvio
-
Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern
-
2014
distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of
deterrence
if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of
deterrence
. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884994
Saved in:
3
Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
Blatter, Marc
;
Emons, Winand
;
Sticher, Silvio
-
2014
distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of
deterrence
if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of
deterrence
. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420625
Saved in:
4
Penalty Structures and
Deterrence
in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence
Anderson, Lisa R.
;
DeAngelo, Gregory
;
Emons, Winand
; …
-
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
-
2015
model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater
deterrence
than increasing penalty structures. We find … for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on
deterrence
. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272717
Saved in:
5
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
Emons, Winand
-
2018
deterrence
. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112083
Saved in:
6
Rebating antitrust fines to encourage private damages actions
Emons, Winand
;
Lenhard, Severin
-
2020
settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced
deterrence
for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program … fine reduction on
deterrence
is, therefore, negative. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420701
Saved in:
7
Rebating antitrust fines to encourage private damages actions
Emons, Winand
;
Lenhard, Severin
-
2020
-
Version: January 2020
settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced
deterrence
for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program … fine reduction on
deterrence
is, therefore, negative. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159842
Saved in:
8
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
Emons, Winand
-
2018
-
Version: October 2018
deterrence
. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919342
Saved in:
9
Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
Blatter, Marc
;
Emons, Winand
;
Sticher, Silvio
-
2014
distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of
deterrence
if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of
deterrence
. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402216
Saved in:
10
Penalty structures and seterrence in a swo-stage model : experimental evidence
Anderson, Lisa R.
;
DeAngelo, Gregory
;
Emons, Winand
; …
-
2015
model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater
deterrence
than increasing penalty structures. We find … for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on
deterrence
. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010509655
Saved in:
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