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Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083745

Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2014

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884994

Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - 2014

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420625

The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion

Emons, Winand - 2018

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an … detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112083

Rebating antitrust fines to encourage private damages actions

Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin - 2020

settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program … the rebate has no effect on the leniency applicant: she doesn't pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420701