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Penalty structures and seterrence in a swo-stage model: Experimental evidence
Anderson, Lisa R.; DeAngelo, Gregory; Emons, Winand; … - 2015
that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. Additionally, our econometric analyses … account, suggesting that subjects consider both current and future penalties. Even controlling for the fine a subject faces … for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on deterrence. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420623
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Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - 2014
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420625
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The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
Emons, Winand - 2018
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112083
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Rebating antitrust fines to encourage private damages actions
Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin - 2020
the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would … the rebate has no effect on the leniency applicant: she doesn't pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a … fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420701
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Non-comparative versus comparative advertising as a quality signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2008
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316055
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Adversarial versus inquisitorial testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316067
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Non-comparative versus comparative advertising as a quality signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2008
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923372
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Adversarial versus inquisitorial testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923374
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Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - 2014
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402216
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Penalty structures and seterrence in a swo-stage model : experimental evidence
Anderson, Lisa R.; DeAngelo, Gregory; Emons, Winand; … - 2015
that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. Additionally, our econometric analyses … account, suggesting that subjects consider both current and future penalties. Even controlling for the fine a subject faces … for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on deterrence. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010509655