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Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. Even if an agent is law abiding, she may still commit the act accidentally. The agents are wealth constrained. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. If the benefit from the...
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First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender's entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a...
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Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or …) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We experimentally test a two-stage theoretical … model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. We find …
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To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle...
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