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dampens cooperation, though only slightly. Surprisingly, externalities are immaterial. If we control for beliefs, they even … foster cooperation. If we combine both qualifications and do not control for beliefs, we only find an uncertainty effect. If … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475
Providing public goods is hard, because providers are best off free-riding. Is it even harder if one group's public good is a public bad for another group or, conversely, gives the latter a windfall profit? We experimentally study public goods provision embedded in a social context and find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877140
participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation … Game ; Beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490177
In a full-information, zero transactions costs world, the degree of protection afforded to an entitlement does not affect the likelihood of efficient trade. In reality, imperfect information is often inevitable. Specifically, a party will usually have incomplete information about fairness norms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011633871
In a full-information, zero transactions costs world, the degree of protection afforded to an entitlement does not affect the likelihood of efficient trade. In reality, imperfect information is often inevitable. Specifically, a party will usually have incomplete information about fairness norms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673948
In economic environments, decision-makers may strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others creating socially suboptimal outcomes. We investigate if and how communication mitigates the strategic delay in investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013375345
In economic environments, decision-makers can strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others. This creates free-riding incentives and can lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. We experimentally examine if and how communication mitigates this free-riding problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600