tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that …

in effort, but that the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that redistribution choices even … for everybody. -- Effort ; redistribution ; survey data ; simultaneous equation models ; experiment …

tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that … ; experiment …

their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German …

not need explicit information about their counterpart's choice to learn their risk preference. There are characteristic …

their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German …

in effort, but that the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that redistribution choices even …

We study how cooperative behavior reacts to selective (favorable or unfavorable) pre-play information about the … to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially depends on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial … rather different social norms, depending on whether pre-play information was favorable or unfavorable. In addition, we find …

information about (un)cooperative behavior in other, unrelated, groups. We observe that contributions are considerably sensitive … to such selective information. First impressions participants happen to make predict subsequent behavior. Our results …