Building on a theoretical model we test the hypothesis that effort choices and preferences for redistribution are … preferences for redistribution and effort choices simultaneously. While respondents with stronger preferences for redistribution … tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that …

in effort, but that the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that redistribution choices even … for everybody. -- Effort ; redistribution ; survey data ; simultaneous equation models ; experiment …We use survey and experimental data to explore how effort choices and preferences for redis-tribution are linked. Under …

Building on a theoretical model we test the hypothesis that effort choices and preferences for redistribution are … preferences for redistribution and effort choices simultaneously. While respondents with stronger preferences for redistribution … tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that …

evasion. Nevertheless most people pay their taxes most of the time. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay …

in effort, but that the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that redistribution choices even …We use survey and experimental data to explore how effort choices and preferences for redis-tribution are linked. Under … standard preferences, redistribution would reduce effort. This is different with social preferences. Using data from the World …

Building on a theoretical model we test the hypothesis that effort choices and preferences for redistribution are … preferences for redistribution and effort choices simultaneously. While respondents with stronger preferences for redistribution … tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that …

Building on a theoretical model we test the hypothesis that effort choices and preferences for redistribution are … preferences for redistribution and effort choices simultaneously. While respondents with stronger preferences for redistribution … tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that …

Building on a theoretical model we test the hypothesis that effort choices and preferences for redistribution are … preferences for redistribution and effort choices simultaneously. While respondents with stronger preferences for redistribution … tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that …

Building on a theoretical model we test the hypothesis that effort choices and preferences for redistribution are … preferences for redistribution and effort choices simultaneously. While respondents with stronger preferences for redistribution … tend to have smaller incentives to engage in effort, the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that …

aversion to inequity is sufficiently strong, even individuals with high ability may support redistribution. In a lab experiment … significant negative effect predicted by standard theory. Also, in the field, those who have to pay for redistribution are not …In this paper, we analyze the link between effort and preferences for redistribution. If individ-uals hold standard …