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Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma
Engel, Christoph - 2006
A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058244
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Competition in a Pure World of Internet Telephony
Engel, Christoph - 2007
From the angle of competition policy, Voice over IP looks like a panacea. It not only brings better service, but it … providers classic telephone numbers would enhance systems competition with switched telephony. But this would make it more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053336
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Oligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma: An experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281843
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Oligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma : an experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475
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Oligopoly as a Socially Embedded Dilemma : An Experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186597
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Oligopoly as a Socially Embedded Dilemma. An Experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021689
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Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma
Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006
A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005272705
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Competition in a pure world of Internet telephony
Engel, Christoph - 2007
From the angle of competition policy, Voice over IP looks like a panacea. It not only brings better service, but it … providers classic telephone numbers would enhance systems competition with switched telephony. But this would make it more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264805
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Tacit collusion: The neglected experimental evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2015
no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011331401
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Maverick: Making sense of a conjecture of antitrust policy in the lab
Engel, Christoph; Ockenfels, Axel - 2013
Antitrust authorities all over the world are concerned if a particularly aggressive competitor, a maverick, is bought out of the market. One plausible determinant of acting as a maverick is behavioral: the maverick derives utility from acting competitively. We test this conjecture in the lab. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323861