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A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058244
From the angle of competition policy, Voice over IP looks like a panacea. It not only brings better service, but it … providers classic telephone numbers would enhance systems competition with switched telephony. But this would make it more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053336
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281843
A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005272705
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021689
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186597
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475
From the angle of competition policy, Voice over IP looks like a panacea. It not only brings better service, but it … providers classic telephone numbers would enhance systems competition with switched telephony. But this would make it more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264805
Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. In the first period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-off,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264811
Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain loyal. If firms interact only once, if products are homogenous, if firms compete in price, and if marginal cost is constant, theory even predicts that strategic interaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266995