We show that violations of demand theory are more numerous than previously reported in experimental two-player dictator games. We then apply a new procedure consisting of income-compensated price adjustments that makes the choice sets rationalizable. We introduce a weighted price function that...

We experimentally measure the ability of subjects to coordinate on issues related to the H1N1 inuenza virus before and after an outbreak. Our instrument consists of an H1N1 survey converted into a coordination game. We show that the degree of coordination on beliefs about (1) H1N1 prevention,...

We experimentally test the ability of subjects to identify repeated-game strategies from prisoner's dilemma choice data. In the experiments, subjects use a finite state grammar to build models to fit game histories. The histories are designed to distinguish between strategies with empirical and...

We experimentally study behavior in a common property renewable resource extraction game with multiple equilibria. In the experiment, pairs of subjects competitively extract and consume a renewable resource in continuous time. We find that play evolves over time into multiple steady states, with...

We elicit subjects' willingness to pay to reduce future risk. In our experiments, subjects are given a cash endowment and a risky lottery. They report their willingness to pay to exchange the risky lottery for a safe one. Subjects play the lottery either immediately, eight weeks later, or...

This paper reports results from an application of Thomas Schelling's (1960) concept of a focal point to the measure of social agreement on the received tone of media content. In our experiments, subjects rate the tone, positive, negative, or neutral, of newspaper articles and news broadcasts,...

We experimentally test whether risk aversion or ambiguity aversion can explain decisions in a learning-by-doing game. We first measure subjects' preferences toward risk and ambiguity, and then use these measures to predict behavior in the game. We find that ambiguity averse subjects pay more...

I experimentally test play in five indefinitely repeated games: a hawk-dove game, a game of chicken, a trust game, a coordination game, and a constant-sum game. I compare the different game histories that affect decision making in each of the games. Une étude expérimentale a été menée afin...

The lack of adoption of new farming technologies despite known benefis is a well-documented phenomenon in development economics. In addition to a number of market constraints, risk aversion predominates the discussion of behavioral determinants of technology adoption. We hypothesize that...

We alter who gets the last word on the outcome in three different types of trust games: the first mover, the second mover, or, a committee comprised of first and second movers. The committee functions in a manner similar to a peer review process, in which experienced subjects pass judgment on...