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. Firing costs help employers indicate that they will not oust employees instead of making promised payments, enabling early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476854
. Firing costs help employers indicate that they will not oust employees instead of making promised payments, enabling early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512416
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015416623
. Firing costs help employers indicate that they will not oust employees instead of making promised payments, enabling early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467795
. Firing costs help employers indicate that they will not oust employees instead of making promised payments, enabling early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469815
. Firing costs help employers indicate that they will not oust employees instead of making promised payments, enabling early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014517424
We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591480
We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557767
We analyze how agents’ present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584858
We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592126