What is the efficient cost of providing telecommunications services to a certain area or type of customer? As developing countries build up their capacity to regulate infrastructure monopolies, cost models are likely to prove increasingly important in answering this question, but without...

This paper shows that the creation of an independent regulatory agency is often not a necessary or sufficient condition to help attract private participation in the operation and financing of the water and sanitation sector in developing countries. However, the odds of an impact are...

Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An...

In this paper, we present a survey of distributional impact analysis of environmental policies with emphasis on taxes envisaged or implemented to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). These policies usually aim at reducing GHG directly or indirectly. However, they can produce important changes...

Estache and Pinglo present a basic assessment of the financial performance of infrastructure service operators in developing countries. They rely on a new database of 120 companies put together to track the evolution of the cost of capital, the cost of equity, and the return of equity for...

Estache, Laffont, and Zhang develop a model to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments - pricing and network investment....

This paper shows that the creation of an independent regulatory agency is often not a necessary or sufficient condition to help attract private participation in the operation and financing of the water and sanitation sector in developing countries. However, the odds of an impact are...