We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...

We explore the country-specific institutional characteristics likely to influence an individual's decision to become an entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedom from corruption, and on 'market freedom' defined as a cluster of variables related to protection of property...

We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain variation in different types of entrepreneurship across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generates hypotheses about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rights and especially...

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...

We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain variation in different types ofentrepreneurship across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generateshypotheses about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rightsand especially...

We explore the country-specific institutional characteristics likely to influence an individual’sdecision to become an entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedomfrom corruption, and on ‘market freedom’ defined as a cluster of variables related toprotection of property...

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called ‘mass privatization’) and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...

We explore the country-specific institutional characteristics likely to influence an individual's decision to become an entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedom from corruption, and on 'market freedom' defined as a cluster of variables related to protection of property...