We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem …'s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results … is less tight, bureaucrats are less venal, or compensation for expropriation is ungenerous. -- corruption ; bureaucratic …

privatization is more likely to be chosen if the government is politically weak. -- Corruption ; Bureaucratic Structure ; Developing …

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem …'s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the quot;corruptibilityquot; of bureaucrats in each case …

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem …'s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results …

entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedom from corruption, and on 'market freedom' defined as a cluster of … extent of corruption. A cluster of institutional indicators representing 'market freedom' is only significant in some … specifications. Freedom from corruption is significantly related to entrepreneurial entry, especially when the richest countries are …

corruption, weaker property rights and especially intellectual property rights, and a larger state on entrepreneurs who plan to … property rights. -- entrepreneurship ; institutions ; corruption ; property rights ; government ; Global Entrepreneurship …

corruption, weaker property rights and especially intellectual property rights, and a larger state on entrepreneurs who plan to …