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This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253772
This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that eventually become part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827846
This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012249763
Payoff security combined with reciprocal upper semicontinuity is sufficient for better-reply security, and consequently for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact, quasiconcave games by Reny's (1999) theorem. Analogously, diagonal payoff security combined with upper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013348845
This paper studies Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields where one player has a head start in the form of additional troops on one of the battlefields. Such games arise naturally in marketing, electoral competition, and military conflict. Sion and Wolfe (1957) have shown that, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013441504
While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as assumed by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013441508
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014333781
As pointed out by Sion and Wolfe (1957), a non-cooperative game on the unit square need not admit a Nash equilibrium, neither in pure nor in randomized strategies. In this paper, we consider finite approximations of the Sion-Wolfe game. For all parameter constellations relevant for the limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014333782
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512633
The …xed rate tender is one of the main operational formats usedby central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. Whileacademic research has largely dismissed the procedure for its tendency to en-courage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of Englandhave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009522185