Showing 1 - 10 of 173
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123363
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012436059
equilibrium outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805749
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in L<sub>p</sub>-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859339
Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420336
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321141
Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251018
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018918
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to Nash equilibrium provided that the overall game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571263
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902571