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We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123363
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012436059
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in L<sub>p</sub>-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859339
Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251018
equilibrium outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805749
Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420336
Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936799
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321141
Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591646