In most developed countries, the provision of water is organized at a local level. The costs and tariffs vary significantly, even between adjacent water utilities. Such heterogeneity is an obvious indication of the sector’s overall inefficiency and stresses a need for institutional...

We study international trade in a model where consumers have non-homothetic preferences and where household income restricts the extensive margin of consumption. In equilibrium, monopolistic producers set high (low) prices in rich (poor) countries but a threat of parallel trade restricts the...

This paper presents a dynamic North-South general equilibrium model with non- homothetic preferences. Innovation takes place in the rich North while firms in the poor South at random imitate products manufactured in the North. The model is able to generate endogenous product cycles as described...

We study a model of endogenous growth where firms invest both in product and process innovations. Product innovations (that open up completely new product lines) satisfy the advanced wants of the rich. Subsequent process innovations (that decrease costs per unit of quality) transform the...

This paper presents a dynamic North-South general equilibrium model with non- homothetic preferences. Innovation takes place in the rich North while firms in the poor South at random imitate products manufactured in the North. The model is able to generate endogenous product cycles as described...

This paper presents an attempt to create competition in the water market by means of direct competition. We argue that the usual liberalisation device, competition for the market by franchise bidding, is problematic due to the particular features of the water industry. Our approach proposes the...

Die vorliegende Dissertation im Fach Volkswirtschaftslehre besteht aus drei Beiträgen zur Einkommensverteilung und zum Fiskalföderalismus in der Schweiz. Zusammengenommen liefern sie ein akzentuiertes Bild des Schweizer Wohlfahrtsstaats, insbesondere auf kantonaler Ebene. Kapitel 2 (erster...