Showing 1 - 10 of 12
The effect of severance pay on management behavior during a takeover battle is generally ambiguous. Yet, the severance payment completely restraining all influence activities always constitutes a golden handshake. The manager leaving office still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010311219
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003583632
The effect of severance pay on management behavior during a takeover battle is generally ambiguous. Yet, the severance payment completely restraining all influence activities always constitutes a "golden handshake." The manager leaving office still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491061
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657448
We analyze a Tullock-type takeover contest between two CEOs. To deter wasteful influence activities in shareholder optimum, the parachute compensates the (potentially) foregone earnings of the contestant whose incentives to invest in such activities are strongest. Therefore, the parachute is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713484
The effect of severance pay on management behavior during a takeover battle is generally ambiguous. Yet, the severance payment completely restraining all influence activities always constitutes a golden handshake. The manager leaving office still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956942
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009980994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013436193
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051673
We analyze a Tullock-type takeover contest between two CEOs. To deter wasteful influence activities in shareholder optimum, the parachute compensates the (potentially) foregone earnings of the contestant whose incentives to invest in such activities are strongest. Therefore, the parachute is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039759