We analyze the simultaneous relationship between managerial ownership, board structure, and firm value, using a sample of all UK non-financial listed companies. We test the hypothesis that managers in the UK should become entrenched at a higher level of ownership compared to their US...

In Western Europe and East Asia capital markets require higher dividends from corporations tightly affiliated (at the 20% level of control) to a group and within a group from corporations whose controlling shareholder has a lower ratio O/C of ownership to control rights. For loosely-affiliated...

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of corporate responses to financial distress during an economy-wide crisis, specifically through the restructuring of assets (through asset sales, mergers, or liquidations) and/or liabilities. Using firm-level data from five countries hardest hit...

We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that,...

"Evidence from firms in 47 countries shows that companies with political connections have higher leverage and higher market shares, but they underperform compared to nonconnected companies on an accounting basis. Differences between connected and unconnected firms are more pronounced when...

Using new data for the universe of firms covered in Amadeus, we reconstruct the portfolios of shareholders who hold equity stakes in private- and publicly traded European firms. We find great heterogeneity in the degree of portfolio diversification across large shareholders. Exploiting this...

We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that,...

We study the evolution of the control structure of 141 privatized firms from OECD countries over the period from 1996 through 2000. We find that governments do not relinquish control after "privatization." We show that the market-to-book ratios of privatized firms converge through time to those...