We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key...

In this article, we analyze the characteristics of legal thresholds crossings in France during the years 2001 through 2003. Our data set created using the publications of the financial authorities and economic and financial data from Bloomberg comprises a total of 2.396 operations and displays a...

We study horizontal partial acquisitions in an oligopolistic industry in the absence of synergies. Contrary to existing results, we find that a dominant shareholder may choose to acquire shares in a competitor although the aggregate profit of the group of firms under his control, and even the...

We study horizontal partial ownership arrangements in an oligopolistic industry in the absence of synergies. Contrary to existing results, we find that a dominant shareholder may choose to acquire shares in a competitor although the aggregate profit of the two firms is reduced. This is due to a...

We analyze the incentives of a controlling shareholder of a firm to acquire, directly or indirectly through his firm, shares in a competitor. We charaterize the conditions under which these partial acquisitions are profitable for this dominant shareholder as well as the equilibrium toehold and...