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Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - 2002
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations … effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like … the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409795
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Incentives and information as driving forces of default effects
Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Grunewald, Andreas - 2013
follow default options the less they are privately informed about the relevant decision environment. In the second part of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128312
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Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions
Brown, Martin; Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We provide experimental evidence that contractual incompleteness, ie, the absence of third party enforcement of workers’ effort or the quality of the good traded causes a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. If contracts are complete the vast majority of trades are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661770
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Reference Points and Effort Provision
Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004026
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Reference Points and Effort Provision
Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, … - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552269
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Reference points and effort provision
Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - 2009
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264587
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Reference points and effort provision
Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - 2009
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269296
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Reference points and effort provision
Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - 2009
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277508
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Reference Points and Effort Provision
Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent references is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791668
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Reference Points and Effort Provision
Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, … - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005796054