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Horizontal mergers with synergies : cash vs. profit-share auctions

Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: International journal of industrial organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 382-391

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010247687

Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2014

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352

Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - In: International journal of industrial organization 47 (2016), pp. 1-32

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653754

Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction

Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008685480

Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions

Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 382-391

profit-share auctions, first- and second-price, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if …. Unlike cash auctions, profit-share auctions are not revenue equivalent, and the second-price profit-share auction is more … profitable than the other auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730067

Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung; Wolfstetter, Elmar - In: International Journal of Game Theory 43 (2014) 1, pp. 215-244

This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming firms observe imperfect signals of the cost reduction induced by the innovation. The innovator adopts a direct revelation mechanism and awards an unrestricted license to the firm that reports the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845482

Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 388-402

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049835

Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140993

Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction

Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2010

of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333759

Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates

Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2006

We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333774