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We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are “boundedly rational” in the sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some...
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We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are quot;boundedly rationalquot; in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012757993
We propose a model of bounded rationality based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision maker%u2019s thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time and let the decision maker %u201Cthink ahead%u201D about future decision problems in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224897
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463995
We propose a model of bounded rationality based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time and let the decision maker "think ahead" about future decision problems in yet unrealized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466804
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010637914