We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are “boundedly rational” in the sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some...

We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable...

We propose a model of bounded rationality based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision maker%u2019s thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time and let the decision maker %u201Cthink ahead%u201D about future decision problems in...

We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable...

We propose a model of costly decision making based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision-maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time, and lets the decision maker 'think ahead' about future decision problems in yet...

We propose a model of bounded rationality based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision maker%u2019s thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time and let the decision maker %u201Cthink ahead%u201D about future decision problems in...