banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue … that this has two effects on banks, with opposing implications for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between … bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks' capital structure needs to be less concerned with …

In a theoretical model of the Diamond-Dybvig style, in which deposit-taking banks and financial markets coexist, bank … the interaction of market liquidity and banks' funding liquidity in the propagation of shocks in the financial system. Our … deteriorations as a consequence of fire sales of assets in financial markets. Nevertheless, banks only prefer holding liquidity …

, while—on the intensive margin—riskier borrower banks suffer more. Moreover, the cross-border liquidity crunch is … substantially stronger for term loans, and weaker for foreign lender banks that have a subsidiary in the same country than the …

In a theoretical model of the Diamond-Dybvig style, in which deposit-taking banks and financial markets coexist, bank … the interaction of market liquidity and banks' funding liquidity in the propagation of shocks in the financial system. Our … deteriorations as a consequence of fire sales of assets in financial markets. Nevertheless, banks only prefer holding liquidity …

- border lending after the Lehman failure; for banks headquartered in periphery countries, the impact is quantitatively …

margin—riskier borrower banks suffer more. Moreover, the cross-border liquidity crunch is substantially stronger for term … loans, and weaker for foreign lender banks that have a subsidiary in the same country than the borrower. Finally …

- border lending after the Lehman failure; for banks headquartered in periphery countries, the impact is quantitatively …

banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue … that this has two effects on banks, with opposing implications for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between … bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks' capital structure needs to be less concerned with …

We use a unique security-level data set to analyze whether German banks use their customer portfolios and affiliated … mutual funds as an exit channel for risky sovereign bonds in the European sovereign debt crisis. Matching banks' proprietary … evidence that banks sold off risky Euro area sovereign bonds to both their retail customers and their affiliated mutual funds …

We analyze how banks’ equity stakes in firms influence their credit supply in crisis times. For identification, we …-firm credit exposures with the security register data that include banks’ equity holdings. We find that a large and ex … weak banks. This ex-ante risk-taking may be due to better (insider) information by the bank, including a traditional …