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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502711
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
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Limited rationality and strategic interaction : the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia
Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001732428
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Limited rationality and strategic interaction : the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia
Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001745821
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Limited rationality and strategic interaction : the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia
Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 76 (2008) 2, pp. 353-394
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003680236
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025032
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should – in theory – provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023778
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023914
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A goal programming constrained regression review of the Bell System breakup
Charnes, Abraham - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 34 (1988) 1, pp. 1-26
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001057361