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Fairness and retaliation : the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, Ernst; Gaechter, Simon - 2000
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781614
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Fairness and retaliation : the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon - 2000
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001539238
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Fifty years of mincer earnings regressions
Heckman, James J. (contributor);  … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001760429
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Fifty years of Mincer earnings regressions
Heckman, James J.; Lochner, Lance; Todd, Petra - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001765849
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Competition and relational contracts : the role of unemployment as a disciplinary device
Brownley, Martine Watson; Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003725052
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Competition and relational contracts : the role of unemployment as a disciplinary device
Brown, Martin (contributor); Falk, Armin (contributor);  … - 2008
When unemployment prevails, relations with a particular firm are valuable for workers. As a consequence, a worker may … workers with wages that exceed the going market rate. This motivates workers to provide high effort, even though they could … shirk and switch firms. Our results thus suggest that unemployment is not a necessary device to motivate workers. We also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003656931
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Meritocracy in America : wages within and across occupations
Cawley, John H.; Heckman, James J.; Vytlacil, Edward - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000657974
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Contracts, fairness, and incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004 - This version: March 31, 2004
contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440446
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Adding a stick to the carrot? : the interaction of bonuses and fines
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007
In this paper we report on a principal-agent experiment where the principal can choose whether to rely on an unenforcable bonus contract or to combine the bonus contract with a fine if the agent's effort falls below a minimum standard. We show that most principals do not use the fine and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365854
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Fairness and contract design
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: November 5, 2005
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080