We introduce and study no-good-deal valuation bounds defined in terms of expected utility. A utility-based good deal is a payoff whose expected utility is toohigh in comparison to the utility of its price. Forbidding good deals induces, viaduality, restrictions on pricing kernels and thereby...

We study the exponential utility indifference valuation of a contingent claim B in an incomplete market driven by two Brownian motions. The claim depends on a nontradable asset stochastically correlated with the traded asset available for hedging. We use martingale arguments to provide upper and...

In this paper we show that reputation formation in endogenously formed relationships is a decisive determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In theabsence of any third party enforcement of debt repayment the contracting parties succeed in establishing stable bilateral...

This paper analyzes the independence of boards of directors as an optimally chosen, non-contractible behavior. A board behaves loyally to a CEO when it agrees to a negative NPV-pro ject, giving the CEO private benefits. While the CEO benefitsfrom competent directors because they help him make...

While the debate on how economic agents form expectations and how these expectationsshould be modelled has been key to modern macroeconomics, money illusion has been ananathema to macroeconomists until recently. The rational expectations revolution in the1970's thoroughly banned the study of...

This paper studies modelling and existence issues for market models of option prices in a continuous-time framework with one stock, one bond and a family of European call options for one fixed maturity and all strikes. After arguing that (classical) implied volatilities are ill-suited for...

An agent shows loyalty to his manager by bearing personal costs to the superiors benefit. In return, the manager may offer various forms of rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. Beyond loyalty, the manager is interested in...

Recent organizational theories suggest that there is a tradeoff between loyalty and competence. This paper tests several such theories in the context of public agencies. Prime ministers, chancellors, and kings alike need to secure the (efficient or inefficient) loyalty of their agencies, such as...

In recent years, tradeable permits (TP) have become widespread in use. One noteworthy point is that the international experience is rather small. Europe has only relatively recently begun to develop such programs. There is a wealth of resources available that comment on the rise of these...

For decades economists have considered money illusion aslargely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion haspowerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs innominal terms almost all subjects play at or close to an inefficientequilibrium whereas if we lift the...