Showing 1 - 10 of 179
goods provision - the quick emergence of a widely accepted social cooperation norm that demands high contributions but - in … consensus as well as the high cooperation demands required by the norm break down. However, when peer punishment is possible … cooperation and welfare - the opportunity to form a social norm unambiguously causes high public good contributions and group …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011854858
reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation. This crowding out effect constitutes costs of incentive provision that have been largely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038698
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003048926
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001691845
Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions … mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation when actions vary continuously. Ambiguous reciprocity, a strategy … generally ruled out in models of reciprocal altruism, completely undermines cooperation under repeated interactions, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013465492
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440446
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440447
We experimentally investigate behavior and beliefs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Each subject had to choose an action as first-mover and a conditional action as second-mover. All subjects also had to state their beliefs about others' second-mover choices. We find that subjects' beliefs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011611150