We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …

incentives through contracts. We provide experimental evidence that principals have a strong preference for less complete … which provides strong pecuniary incentives through an incomplete contract. Selfish principals free-ride and exploit the …