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How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371874
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Psychological Foundations of Incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - 2002
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262734
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282296
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Psychological Foundations of Incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566708
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Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - 2002
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011411627
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Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - 2002
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409795
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On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity
Fehr, Ernst; Brown, Martin; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822329
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On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity
Brown, Martin; Zehnder, Christian; Fehr, Ernst - Schweizerische Nationalbank (SNB) - 2008
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008925002
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Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device
Brown, Martin; Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst - Schweizerische Nationalbank (SNB) - 2008
agreements - or relational contracts - also motivate high worker performance when the labor market is tight? We examine this … not third-party enforceable. We show that relational contracts emerge in which firms reward performing workers with wages …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008925066
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Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device
Brown, Martin; Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find … alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in … overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004025