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How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?

Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371874

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Eects of Power

Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2010

Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life but there is limited empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority. We experimentally study the motivation and incentive effects of authority in an authority-delegation game. Individuals exhibit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764264

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - 2002

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262734

A behavioral account of the labor market: the role of fairness concerns

Fehr, Ernst; Goette, Lorenz; Zehnder, Christian - 2008

incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269083

Contracts as reference points: experimental evidence

Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - 2008

In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and … and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that contracts provide reference points. In this paper, we examine … tradeoff between rigidity and flexibility in a trading environment with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269323

How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?

Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - 2011

Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282296

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus - 2000

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315242

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - 2002

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315339

A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns

Fehr, Ernst; Goette, Lorenz; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762059

Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence

Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763665