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Appropriating the commons : a theoretical explanation

Falk, Armin - 2001

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460996

Super-additive cooperation

Efferson, Charles; Bernhard, Helen; Fischbacher, Urs; … - 2022

one-shot behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus indicate neither an evolutionary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013465492

Appropriating the commons : a theoretical explanation

Falk, Armin - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013423583

Cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons

Fehr, Ernst; Leibbrandt, Andreas - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003804156

Cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons

Fehr, Ernst (contributor); Leibbrandt, Andreas (contributor) - 2008

reduce the current and the future yield for both others and themselves. Accordingly, economic theory predicts that more … fishermen who exhibit a higher propensity for cooperation in a laboratory public goods experiment, and those who show more … patience in a laboratory time preference experiment, exploit the fishing grounds less in their daily lives. Moreover, because …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747646

Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - 2001

We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 percent are conditional cooperators

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171100

Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2021

In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321275

Appropriating the commons : a theoretical explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398786

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Fehr, Ernst - 2003

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222007

Fairness in the labour market : a survey of experimental results

Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - In: Surveys in experimental economics : bargaining, …, (pp. 95-132). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001681110

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