Similar Search Results

On reputation: a microfoundation of contract enforcement and price rigidity

Fehr, Ernst; Brown, Martin; Zehnder, Christian - 2008

We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268857

Testing theories of fairness - Intentions matter

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2008

Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009471715

Super-Additive Cooperation

Efferson, Charles; Bernhard, Helen; Fischbacher, Urs; … - 2022

mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation when actions vary continuously. Ambiguous reciprocity, a strategy … can stabilise cooperative strategies against the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often … consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290043

Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences

Fehr, Ernst; Charness, Gary - 2023

identify what is known about belief-dependent social preferences such as reciprocity and guilt aversion. The evidence indicates …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014377103

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001

reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427343

Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427345

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005

This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427418

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427435

Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315115

Appropriating the Commons A Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315203