provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts …

this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts, even preferring a pure bonus contract over a contract that combines the … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit … contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become …

relational incentives are a powerful causal determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In fact, in the … incentives and exacerbates another moral hazard problem in credit markets ﾖ the choice of inefficient high-risk projects …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

contract enforcement device. It turns out that reciprocity generates a significant increase in effort levels relative to the … prediction based on selfish preferences. Moreover, it gives rise to a considerable mitigation of the contract enforcement problem …

relational incentives are a powerful causal determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In fact, in the … incentives and exacerbates another moral hazard problem in credit markets the choice of inefficient high-risk projects. -- Credit …

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations … effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like … the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and …