, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts, even preferring a pure bonus contract over a contract that combines the … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit … recently developed theories of fairness, which also offer interesting new insights into the interaction of contract choices …