In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … level that prevails in the absence of any feedback. Thus, both no feedback and truthful feedback are better for incentives …

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … level that prevails in the absence of any feedback. Thus, both no feedback and truthful feedback are better for incentives …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …

provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …

contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become … actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit …

contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become … actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit …