Showing 1 - 10 of 493
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003031484
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267590
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502711
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff representation cause pronounced differences in nominal price inertia indicating the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011336869
One of the outstanding results of three decades of laboratory market research is that under rather weak conditions prices and quantities in competitive experimental markets converge to the competitive equilibrium. Yet, the design of these experiments ruled out gift exchange or reciprocity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693902
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398756
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399065
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402672