In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … level that prevails in the absence of any feedback. Thus, both no feedback and truthful feedback are better for incentives …

relational incentives are a powerful causal determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In fact, in the … incentives and exacerbates another moral hazard problem in credit markets the choice of inefficient high-risk projects. -- Credit …

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … level that prevails in the absence of any feedback. Thus, both no feedback and truthful feedback are better for incentives …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …