The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However,...

Marginal rates of contribution (MRC), i.e., the rates at which additional revenues are skimmed via larger contributions or lower transfer receipts, quantify the incentives of a fiscal equalization scheme. The present paper is the first to calculate the marginal rates of contribution for the...

The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However,...

The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However,...

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true...

The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However,...

Marginal rates of contribution (MRC), i.e., the rates at which additional revenues are skimmed via larger contributions or lower transfer receipts, quantify the incentives of a fiscal equalization scheme. The present paper is the first to calculate the marginal rates of contribution for the...

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the com-petitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to...

This paper analyses the importance of fiscal mechanisms for regional risk sharing and redistribution in Switzerland. Switzerland is a particularly interesting setting in this context because it features both a high level of fiscal autonomy for Swiss cantons and explicit fiscal transfers between...

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the com-petitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to...