In the Seel–Strack contest (J Econ Theory 148(5):2033–2048, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">2013</CitationRef>), <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>n</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> agents each privately observe an independent copy of a drifting Brownian motion which starts above zero and is absorbed at zero. Each agent chooses when to stop the process she observes, and the winner of the...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>

This paper discusses the gambling contest introduced in Seel & Strack (Gambling in contests, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 375, Mar 2012.) and considers the impact of adding a penalty associated with failure to follow a winning strategy....

This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced by Seel and Strack. In the Seel-Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and chooses when to stop it. The winner of the contest is the contestant who stops at the highest value....

This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced by Seel and Strack. In the Seel-Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and chooses when to stop it. The winner of the contest is the contestant who stops at the highest value....