Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

The promotion of competition in Europe's network industries has been in the foreground of economic policy in recent years. Network industries have undergone dramatic changes, involving privatisation, liberalisation and de- as well as re-regulation. But there are still many unresolved problems in...

Abstract: Die deutsche Telekommunikationspolitik hat in den letzten 15 Jahren vor allem durch angebotsseitige De- und Re-Regulierung viel erreicht: Drastisch sinkende Preise, zusätzliche Auswahl für Verbraucher, abnehmende Marktkonzentrationen, innovative Dienste und neue Netze kennzeichnen...

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are...