loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or …

may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative … data. With any contract scheme some monitoring will be optimal unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to … the precision of the monitoring signal. In the benchmark situation (without privacy costs) relying completely on both …

loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or …

insureds may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative … data. With any contract scheme some monitor- ing will be optimal unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to … signals (monitoring and the outcome) informative of effort (ii) maximizes welfare. In the presence of privacy costs, the …

may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative … data. With any contract scheme some monitoring will be optimal unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to … the precision of the monitoring signal. In the benchmark situation (without privacy costs) relying completely on both …

loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or …

insureds may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative … data. With any contract scheme some monitor- ing will be optimal unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to … signals (monitoring and the outcome) informative of effort (ii) maximizes welfare. In the presence of privacy costs, the …

loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or …